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Abstract  
 
Why do for-proﬁt ﬁrms take voluntary steps to improve the environment? Do green 
actions indicate that managers are wasting resources in costly programs to produce 
benefit that cannot be captured by the firm? Or is voluntary environmental spending 
profitable for a business sense?  Empirical evidence is decidedly mixed.  In this study, we 
use 19 years of monthly stock price returns to examine the proﬁtability of participation in 
the world’s largest voluntary greenhouse gas mitigation program: the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX).  After controlling for systemic market risk as well as industry-speciﬁc 
shocks, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcantly positive excess returns for firms that announce 
their decision to join CCX.  In addition, the progress of proposed greenhouse gas 
legislation (the Waxman-Markey bill) had a positive and large impact on excess returns 
for CCX member ﬁrms, suggesting that a major incentive for ﬁrms to join CCX may be 
to prepare for future regulation.  Marginal abatement costs (proxied by the carbon price), 
on the other hand, were unrelated to excess returns.  Our results imply that voluntary 
approaches should play a role in combating climate change, but that relying on them 
alone is not enough.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 Environmental regulation is usually discussed in the context of a tradeoff between 
firm profits and environmental benefits.  In contrast, voluntary environmental action is 
sometimes presented as a win-win situation, where everybody benefits, provided that 
firm profits increase and the environmental action is effective.  There is an ongoing 
debate about whether such a virtuous cycle of proﬁtability and environmental 
responsibility exists; if so, voluntary approaches could be used to relax or replace 
regulation, providing ﬁrms with the maximum amount of ﬂexibility (Alberini and 
Segerson, 2002; Khanna, 2001).   
 US Climate policy is a particularly important example of whether voluntary 
approaches can obviate regulation.  At the time of this writing, the USA does not regulate 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on a national level but instead relies on voluntary ﬁrm 
action.1  In contrast, most other industrialized nations have chosen to introduce binding 
regulation.   
 There are theoretical arguments both in favor and against the proﬁtability of 
voluntary environmental investment, and a growing empirical literature that examines the 
relationship between environmental and ﬁnancial performance.  Our paper contributes to 
this literature by studying the effect of membership in the Chicago Climate Exchange 
(CCX), the largest voluntary GHG cap-and-trade market to date.   
 CCX was established in 2003 to provide a formal market for ﬁrms to voluntarily, 
but veriﬁably, reduce GHG emissions, and it expired at the end of 2010. Unlike other 
                                                        1 Although the EPA changed its policy and now includes CO2 as an air pollutant, there are no federal  
standards, taxes or other regulation that puts a price on CO2 emissions.  Regional and local initiatives  
exist, however, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California’s Global Warming  
Solutions Act (AB 32).   
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voluntary GHG programs, CCX included both strict provisions and standards for the 
auditing of emissions reductions, and a formal market for the purchase of abatement 
credits.  In that sense, CCX was a close voluntary equivalent to a mandatory carbon 
market, the policy instrument of choice in many countries to reduce GHG emissions of 
industry.  To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to examine the effect of CCX 
membership on ﬁrm financial performance.  Our ﬁndings therefore have an immediate 
relevance for environmental regulation and policy.   
 The empirical literature about the proﬁtability of voluntary environmental spending 
can be separated into two broad groups.  The ﬁrst compares ﬁnancial performance of a 
“green” portfolio with that of other portfolios over time, usually based on some 
environmental performance index.2  The main challenges with this method are 
unobserved heterogeneity (Telle, 2006) and the identiﬁcation of the effect of voluntary 
action.  Even if an unbiased estimator of the effect is found, the direction of causation 
cannot always be resolved: Are green ﬁrms more proﬁtable because they are green, or are 
they green because they can afford to be?  
 The second thread of literature measures the effect of a discrete event in time (e.g. 
the discharge of toxic waste) on ﬁrm proﬁts.3  Studies of this type offer an advantage in 
identiﬁcation and causation inference relative to the long-term comparison of portfolios, 
but suffer from the limitation that only environmental performance that is ”time stamped” 
can be investigated.   
 Our approach is based on a difference-in-difference estimation over time that                                                         2 E.  g., Derwall et al. (2005); Dowell et al. (2000); Hart and Ahuja (1996); King and Lenox (2001);  
Russo and Fouts (1997); Yamashita et al. (1999); Ziegler et al. (2007).   3 E.  g.  Dasgupta et al. (2001); Filbeck and Gorman (2004); Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (1998); Gupta  
and Goldar (2005); Khanna et al. (1998); Konar and Cohen (1997, 2001); Muoghalu et al. (1995).   
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includes discrete events, thus combining the two approaches.  Our primary focus is on 
estimating the effect of discrete events on ﬁrm proﬁts, such as announcements to join 
CCX and political information relevant for this market. In particular, we argue that the 
passage of the ‘Waxman-Markey’ bill in the US House of Representatives raised the 
likelihood of a mandatory cap-and-trade system in the short to medium term.  We use 
additional data to control for market performance, such as  excess returns from industry 
rivals and the CCX carbon price (as a proxy for marginal abatement costs implied by 
CCX membership).  To control for self-selection bias into the voluntary program, we 
construct control groups of nonmember firms based on propensity score matching.   
 We ﬁnd positive and statistically significant excess returns after firms announce 
their decision to join CCX.  Likewise, the passing of the Waxman- Markey climate bill 
led to positive and statistically signiﬁcant excess returns for CCX member ﬁrms relative 
to nonmember firms, implying that ﬁrms who had gained experience in the voluntary 
market were believed to be better prepared for a possible mandatory market (the 
mandatory market has in fact not materialized to date).  The positive excess returns from 
the climate bill are about twice the magnitude of the announcement effect, suggesting that 
preparing for future mandatory regulation was an important motivation for firms to join 
CCX.   
 
2.  Background and Literature Review 
 At the time of the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, the USA was the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, and 
therefore the most prominent non-participant.  While that process ultimately resulted in a 
market for tradable carbon offsets in Europe (the EU Emissions Trading Scheme), the 
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lack of an agreement or legislation in the US meant that emission of greenhouse gases 
remained unregulated.  In 2003, the Chicago Climate Exchange opened a trading 
exchange for voluntary greenhouse gas emissions reductions and offsets in North 
America and Brazil.  CCX has been followed by a host of nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt 
companies that seek to generate, ﬁnance, sell, and market emissions reductions and 
offsets.4   
 
2.1 The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)  
 The CCX was a voluntary GHG cap-and-trade market that  existed from 2003 to 
2010, and was the most significant voluntary GHG market to date.  Member ﬁrms paid an 
annual membership fee and agreed to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases.  The 
fee ranged from $1,000 to $35,000 per year, depending on the size of the ﬁrm and the 
type of membership.  Although participation was voluntary, compliance with emission 
reduction objectives was legally-binding for members.   
 All emission baselines and annual emission reports were subject to independent 
veriﬁcation.5  Members committed to reduce their emissions by a ﬁxed amount below 
their established baseline, which included about 700 million tons of CO2 (corresponding 
to about a third of the EU ETS baseline, the largest cap-and-trade market to date).  Firms 
that reduced beyond their target received surplus allowances to sell or bank; those who 
failed to meet the targets complied by purchasing emissions allowances. These                                                         4 A review of the CCX and other voluntary programs can be found in Kollmuss et al. (2008).   5 There are 3 classes of membership on CCX: Members, participant members, and associate members.   
Participant members establish a registry and get their emissions veriﬁed, but don’t make any commitment  
on emissions reduction.  Associate members have negligible direct emissions, but pledge to report and  
fully offset their indirect emissions.  We focus here solely on full members: Those with sizeable direct 
emissions who pledge to reduce them.    
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allowances, or ‘Carbon Financial Instrument’ (CFI) contracts, consisted of exchanged 
allowances and carbon offset credits from qualifying projects, which could be located in 
any country except those listed in Annex 1 of the Kyoto protocol.  Figure 1 shows the 
CCX carbon price and trade volumes.   
 There were two distinct phases to the CCX program.  During phase 1, from 2003 to 
2006, members agreed to cut their emissions by 1% each year below their baseline 
average (1998 to 2001), thereby achieving a reduction of 4% by the end of the fourth year.  
During phase 2, from 2007 to 2010, existing members had to further cut their annual 
emissions to achieve the target of 6% by 2010.  New members who did not participate in 
the ﬁrst phase therefore had to reduce emissions by 1.5% per year such that they achieved 
the same relative emissions reduction as phase 1 members.  At the end of 2010, the cap-
and-trade market was discontinued.6   
 
Figure 1 about here.  
 
2.2 Related literature  
 The literature about voluntary environmental investment revolves around the 
question of whether such investments are beneﬁcial for ﬁrms, shareholders and/or the 
environment.  Proposed answers range from a ﬂat-out rejection of voluntary 
environmental investments as an irresponsible waste of money (Friedman, 1970) to a 
                                                        
6 CCX was founded by Climate Exchange PLC, a publicly traded company. In July 2010, Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE) acquired CCX and its global affiliates. Members reduced emissions by more than the 
required amount by the end of 2010, explaining the virtually zero carbon price in the last year.  In July 
2011, ICE launched the CCX Offset Registry Program, a platform to generate, register and trade carbon 
credits based on verified emission reductions (CCX fact sheet by ICE, available at www.theice.com/ccx, 
last accessed in June 2012).   
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belief that such investment not only pay for itself, but will generate a proﬁt in most cases, 
while improving environmental quality at the same time (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).  
A general discussion about when corporate social responsibility pays off can be found in 
Heal (2005) and Khanna (2001).   
 Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) develop a model in which some ﬁrms ﬁnd it 
proﬁtable to over-comply with environmental regulation.  Consumers have identical 
green preferences but varying income levels, leading to market segmentation based on 
willingness and ability to pay.  An important assumption in the model is that ﬁrms are 
able to effectively and credibly communicate the ”greenness” embedded in their product, 
a point also emphasized by Reinhardt (1999).  More generally, voluntary green spending 
can be viewed as a form of advertising or marketing, allowing the ﬁrm to gain market 
share when consumers value environmental quality.  Anton et al. (2004) ﬁnd that 
consumer pressure is an important factor in explaining voluntary environmental 
investment by firms.   
 A second rationale for voluntary environmental improvement comes from the 
investor side.  Heinkel et al. (2001) construct a model where a subset of investors have 
green preferences and refuse to hold stock from ”dirty” ﬁrms.  If the pool of green 
investors is large enough, equity from green ﬁrms will sell at a premium, leading to lower 
capital costs for these ﬁrms relative to the market overall.   
 Voluntary action could also be explained by strategic interaction between ﬁrms.  
Nehrt (1996) examines timing and intensity of environmental investment, and ﬁnds that 
ﬁrst movers proﬁt more than followers.  This result is closely related to the literature 
about ”raising rivals’ costs”, where a dominant ﬁrms seeks to gain market share at the 
 8 
expense of its rivals by increasing (everyone’s) costs (Hart and Tirole, 1990; 
Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986; Salop and Scheffman, 1983, 1987).  The cost increase can 
take many forms, including triggering new standards by over-complying with current 
regulation.  The strategy is proﬁtable if the dominant ﬁrm’s average cost increase is less 
than the marginal cost increase of its rivals.   
 There may be further scope for strategic voluntary action if long-term ﬁrm proﬁts 
also depend on their relationship with stakeholders such as workers, labor unions, 
municipalities, as well as different levels of government.  Even though voluntary action 
may be costly in the short run, improved relations may more than recover the costs in the 
long-run (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; McWilliams et al., 2006).  Naturally, this depends 
on the magnitude of the involved short-run costs and the long-run beneﬁts, as well as 
investors’ rate of time preference.   
 Lastly, another potential beneﬁt of voluntary emission reductions, and one that 
turns out to be pertinent for our case, is the experience gained in abatement, which may 
make it less costly to comply if regulation is later imposed (Khanna, 2001).  Our results 
suggest that this pathway could play an important role for participation in CCX.   
 The common underlying idea of these theoretical arguments is that the beneﬁts 
from voluntary action may outweigh the costs, rendering voluntary action proﬁtable for 
ﬁrms and shareholders, not just the environment.7  This is the theoretical starting point 
for empirical studies aiming to identify a link between voluntary environmental action 
and ﬁnancial performance.   
                                                        7 There is a separate literature that focuses specifically on the environmental effectiveness of various 
voluntary programs.  In the current context, Matisoff (2012) finds that emissions from firms that 
participated in the CCX decreased, but that this decrease was due to a reduction in output rather than a 
reduction of carbon intensity.   
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 Many applications have focused on local pollutants such as toxic waste.  The results 
are mixed; some papers ﬁnd a positive relationship between environmental and ﬁnancial 
performance (Dowell et al., 2000; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Khanna et al., 1998; King and 
Lenox, 2002; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Muoghalu et al., 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997), 
whereas others ﬁnd a negative relationship (Konar and Cohen, 1997) or no correlation at 
all (Filbeck and Gorman, 2004; King and Lenox, 2001; Telle, 2006).   
 Our paper measures the financial performance of a voluntary GHG reduction 
program.  Voluntary emission reduction of a global stock pollutant is different to 
reducing local pollution in several important ways.  On the one hand, GHG emissions of 
any single ﬁrm are unlikely to yield a visible environmental impact.  This means that 
consumers and investors have to be informed about the existence and effects of climate 
change in order to have a preference for products or shares of the GHG-reducing ﬁrm vis-
à-vis their competitors.  On the other hand, the global nature of GHG emissions can 
potentially send positive signals far beyond a local region.  For example, Japanese 
consumers may value a reduction of GHG emissions by a US ﬁrm as much as Americans, 
which is presumably not the case for a reduction in local pollution.  Many of the CCX 
members are multinational ﬁrms whose shares are globally traded.   
 Few papers have focused on the effect of GHG-reducing programs on ﬁrms’ 
ﬁnancial performance.  Kim and Lyon (2011) provide evidence that ﬁrms strategically 
disclose emissions in the US Department of Energy’s 1605b Program, using a propensity 
score matching technique to match participants with rivals that is very similar to the one 
we use in our paper.  They ﬁnd that ﬁrms tend to report emission reductions but withhold 
emission increases, and that participant ﬁrms’ emissions actually increased relative to 
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non-participating industry rivals.  Mallory (2009) examines a similar program in Canada 
with a focus on ﬁrms’ market performance, but ﬁnds no statistically signiﬁcant difference 
relative to ﬁrms that do not disclose emissions.   
 Oberndorfer (2009) examines excess returns of EU electricity generators and finds 
that they are positively related to the permit price in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
after controlling for market risk (since the EU ETS is a mandatory market that covers a 
particular set of industries, there are no non-participating industry rivals).  The results 
could be explained by a combination of cost pass-through to consumers and a very 
generous free allocation policy (Hintermann, 2011; Sijm et al., 2006).8   
 The two papers that are perhaps closest to ours are Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn 
(1998) and Ziegler et al. (2009).  The former is an event study among US ﬁrms that 
joined the voluntary programs Climate Leaders and Ceres, both of which aim to reduce 
GHG emissions.  Matching daily stock data with ﬁrm announcements to join either 
program, the authors ﬁnd that announcement excess returns were negative.  The results 
varied somewhat by industry as well as by the book-to-market ratio, but they conclude 
that for the ﬁrms in their sample, voluntary environmental action was not proﬁtable.   
 Ziegler et al. (2009) compare the average stock performance of portfolios of US 
and European stock that differ in their climate-related policies, using the same four-factor 
model that is on which we base our analysis.  Environmental action taken by ﬁrms, such 
as announcing emission-reduction goals, or press releases relating to climate change, 
were seen to reduce average returns over the sample period (2001-2006) for the US firms.                                                          8 Furthermore, it is possible that the EUA carbon price during the ﬁrst part of phase 1 substantially  
exceeded marginal abatement costs (Hintermann, 2010), and that the price was driven by the (declining) 
probability that the cap would turn out to be binding at all (Hintermann, 2012) .    
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For European firms, they measured a positive effect on returns for the period after 2003, 
when the EU adopted a more forceful approach to combating climate change.  Our paper 
provides additional empirical evidence about the effect of voluntary reductions of GHG 
emissions on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial performance in the absence of mandatory regulation, but 
where such regulation is at least possible in the short to medium term.   
 
3. Model 
 
 Our goal is to identify the effect of joining CCX on ﬁrm proﬁtability, which we 
proxy by excess returns.9  We start with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965),10 and extend it by including relevant 
firm-level data.  Our identification strategy is a difference-in-difference estimation, where 
the treatment group consists of firms that joined CCX.  Since membership is endogenous, 
we construct the control group through propensity score matching.  Finally, we use the 
panel nature of our data to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms.   
 
3.1 The four-factor model  
According to the CAPM, risk-adjusted excess returns from holding a particular security 
                                                        
9 If the market correctly prices securities, stock prices are equal to the discounted expected stream of 
dividends, which in turn reflect firm profits.  If the efficient market hypothesis does not hold and stock 
prices are also affected by variables other than future proﬁts, such as self-fulﬁlling expectations or 
investor ”herding” behavior, our approach remains valid as long as the deviation between price and 
fundamental equally applies to CCX member ﬁrms and their rivals.  Other researchers use Tobin’s Q 
(equity value divided by market replacement cost of assets) which can be interpreted as a measure of 
intangible ﬁrm value.  But like stock prices, Tobin’s Q tends to be non- stationary, which complicates 
statistical inference in our multivariate regression approach.  Taking ﬁrst differences solves the non-
stationarity problem, but since the market replacement cost presumably does not change month-to-month, 
the information contained in ﬁrst-differenced Tobin’s Q is identical to the information contained in returns 
(proportional first differences).   
10 See Fama and French (2004) for a review of its history and application.  The main reason why we use the 
CAPM is that it is frequently applied finance, and its parsimonious nature.  Rather than making stock prices 
depend on a range of (usually unobserved) firm characteristics, the CAPM relies on aggregate market 
information to price stock.   
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are equal to overall market returns, or: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖]−𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓
𝛽𝛽
=  𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚] −  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓    with        𝛽𝛽 ≡  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚]𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟[𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚]                              (1) 
 
where 𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖] is the expected return on asset i (which can be a portfolio or an individual 
security11), 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 is the risk-free rate of interest, and 𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚] refers to the expected rate of 
return of the stock market as a whole.  The difference between the return from a risky 
asset and the risk-free rate of interest is known as the excess return or the risk premium.   
 The adjustment factor β in equation (1) relates expected excess returns from 
holding an individual security to expected excess returns in the market overall.  It 
measures market or systemic risk, which is the risk that cannot be diversiﬁed away by 
combining securities into one portfolio.  In the original CAPM, β is the sole variable (also 
called ”factor”) that determines the average return of an asset, the underlying assumption 
being that markets are efficient and all relevant other information is already incorporated 
in prices.  Because of this, the CAPM is also known as the “1-factor model” and usually 
expressed by restating (1) in terms of excess returns: 𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖]−𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽𝛽� 𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚] −  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓�.  The 
associated empirical regression equation is derived by adding a time dimension, a 
constant, and replacing the expectations with an error term:  
 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽� 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 −  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     with    𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 0;   𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟[𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 𝜎𝜎2;       (2) 
 
                                                        
11 For a balanced panel with N x T observations, regressing individual stock returns on time-varying  
common factors yields the same point estimates as regressing cross-section averages (i.e. portfolio returns) 
on the same factors.  In our case of an unbalanced panel, the point estimates will slightly differ because the 
portfolio approach equally weights time averages, whereas the individual stock regression gives equal 
weight to all observations, implying a greater weight for months with more data.  The interpretation of α 
and β remains unchanged.   
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 The constant 𝛼𝛼 is known as Jensen’s alpha.  Since a nonzero value for  indicates 
an over- or undervaluation of an asset, which should be arbitraged away if transactions 
costs are not too high, the null hypothesis is always that .  The adjustment factor is 
unity for the market overall by construction.  If asset i is associated with a higher 
systemic risk than the market overall, , and vice versa.   
 To address some of the anomalies observed in stock markets,12 Fama and French 
(1992, 1993) extended the 1-factor model to adjust for price effects related to ﬁrm size 
and value.  Carhart (1997) added a fourth factor in order to address momentum trading 
strategies, leading to the following speciﬁcation, which has become known as the ”four-
factor” model in the ﬁnancial literature:  
 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 (3) 
 
 The factor SMBt (“small-minus-large”) is computed as the difference between the 
return of a stock portfolio comprising small ﬁrms (in terms of market value) and that of a 
portfolio of large ﬁrms.  HMLt (“high-minus-low”) refers to the valuation of a stock 
relative to company assets and is the return of a portfolio of stocks with a high book-to-
market ratio (so-called “growth” stocks) minus a portfolio of stock where book-to-market 
is low (“blue chips”).13  Finally, MOMt is the “momentum factor” and is the difference 
between the return of a portfolio comprised of “winning” stocks minus the return of a 
                                                        
12 See e.g. Banz (1981) and De Bondt and Thaler (1985).   
13 The book-to-market ratio is deﬁned as book equity divided by market equity.  Book equity captures a 
ﬁrm’s total assets minus liabilities and is deﬁned as the value of stockholders’ equity plus the value of 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the value of preferred stock; market equity is the stock 
price times the number of shares. 
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portfolio of “losing” stock.14  Data for SMBt , HMLt and MOMt for the US stock market 
are available from Kenneth French’s online data library.15  The four-factor model is a 
frequently used asset-pricing model in applied work, mainly due to its parsimony and 
data requirements.  Besides the three factors and the risk-free rate of interest, all of which 
are publicly available, the only additional data needed are ﬁrm returns.  In general, non-
systemic or idiosyncratic asset risk can be diversiﬁed away by including a sufficient 
number of imperfectly correlated assets into a single portfolio and is thus not reﬂected in 
average security prices according to equations (2) and (3).  However, since we aim to 
identify the effect CCX membership on individual firm profits, we need to extend the 
four-factor model to include firm-level information.   
 
3.2 Adding firm-level information  
 First, we include a dummy that marks CCX membership.  Since the market 
incorporates information as soon as it becomes available (whether it does so fully and/or 
immediately is a matter of some dispute in the empirical literature), we use ﬁrm 
announcements to join CCX rather than the actual joining dates.  The membership 
dummy reverts to zero for firms that exit the system at the end of Phase I.  We do not 
observe any member firm exits in Phase 2.   
 The second variable we include is a regulatory expectations proxy.  The likelihood 
of future regulation is one of the possible reasons for joining a voluntary emissions 
reduction program such as CCX.  Specifically, we focus our attention on the Waxman-                                                        14 The actual calculation is the difference between the average of 2 two winning portfolios (formed from small firms and big firms), minus the average from two losers (small and big).  The winners and losers are formed above the 70% percentile form the previous month, and below the 30% percentile, respectively.   
15 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html (last access on 8/16/2011).   
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Markey bill (the ‘American Clean Energy and Security Act’), which sought to limit the 
emission of greenhouse gases and establish a mandatory emissions-trading scheme at the 
Federal level.  Our hypothesis is that passage of the bill by the House of Representatives 
increased investors’ assessment of the probability that a mandatory federal cap-and-trade 
system would be instituted in the medium term.  In such a system, previous CCX 
membership could be viewed as an advantage because these ﬁrms already have market 
experience.16  We add a time dummy for June 2009, the month when the Waxman-
Markey bill was passed in the US House of Representatives, as well as an interaction 
term between membership and the Waxman dummies to get a difference-in-difference-
type estimator.   
 Third, we incorporate information about the compliance costs implied by CCX 
membership (abatement costs plus net permit expenditures).  We proxy these costs with 
the CCX carbon price, which should be a lower bound for marginal abatement costs.17  A 
price change will translate to a change in overall expected compliance costs, which in 
turn implies lower proﬁtability and thus lower excess returns, ceteris paribus.   
 Next, we control for industry-level shocks by including average excess returns of 4-
digit industry rivals.  That is, we compute monthly average returns by 4-digit SIC code                                                         
16 Prospects for an imminent federal cap-and-trade system decreased somewhat when the bill was tabled in 
the Senate and attention was focused on the recession and the deﬁcit.  This undoubtedly postponed the 
advent of a mandatory program, but mandatory permit trading remains the cornerstone of action against 
climate change in most other OECD countries, making it at least possible that the US will eventually 
institute a Federal mandatory system as well.  Because there was no clearly identifiable moment at which 
the probability of a mandated program decreased, we did not include an “anti-Waxman” dummy in the 
analysis.  If such a moment existed, we would expect negative excess returns for CCX members.   
17 The weak inequality follows directly from stepwise marginal abatement cost curves.  A second reason for 
our assumption is related to perception: The voluntary nature of the market should not change the basic 
arbitrage condition that ﬁrms abate as long as this is cheaper than buying permits.  The reverse, however, 
may not be true if ﬁrms’ main incentive to join CCX is to generate an image of greenness: They could 
choose to abate even if this is costlier than covering all of their emissions by purchasing permits.  There 
remains a stigma of absolution from environmental sins associated with buying offsets, if not among 
economists then in the general public.   
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and add them as an additional variable to each firm, based on its industry classification.  
Finally, we further control for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity by allowing for 
random effects (RE).   
 
3.3 Econometric speciﬁcation  
 In order to derive an econometric specification that is consistent with theory, we 
have to start by the price-level equation that gives rise to the CAPM, add the new 
variables in a consistent way and then derive the regression equation based on returns.  
These steps are carried out in Appendix A.  The resulting econometric specification is  
 
         (4) 
 
The first line represents the four-factor model.  On the second line,  is the 
membership dummy and is equal to 1 for active CCX members (more precisely, for firms 
that have announced that they would join), and zero otherwise.  Therefore, the first-
differenced membership dummy  is equal to one during the month of the 
announcement, minus one when a firm leaves the system, and zero otherwise.18  We refer 
                                                        18 We set the announcement dummy to one for the month of the announcement for all firms.  To address the fact that some firms joined late in the month, giving the market much less time to react than for firms joining early, we set the announcement dummy equal to one for the month following the announcement month for all firms that announced their decision to join after the 15th of each month.  This means that the period during which we measure excess returns after the announcement varies from a minimum of 15 days (for firms announcing on the 15th) to a maximum of 44 days (for firms announcing on the 16th).   
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to the first-differenced membership dummy as the “announcement” dummy.19   is a 
time dummy that takes the value of 1 in June 2009 (the passing of the Waxman-Markey 
bill), and zero for all other months.  The coefficient on the interaction term with the 
membership dummy ( ) captures the difference-in-difference effect of the bill on the 
treated, i.e. on member firms.   
The third line in (4) contains excess returns from industry rivals ( ), carbon 
price returns ( ), carbon price levels ( ), as well as an interaction term between 
carbon prices and CCX membership.  The effect of carbon price returns on returns for 
nonmembers is captured by  and is presumably zero, since these firms do not face a 
binding carbon constraint.  For member firms, the effect of carbon prices is given by 
, such that  is the difference-in-difference estimator for the effect of carbon 
prices on the treatment group.  The first term in the parenthesis is the effect of carbon 
price returns for “old” member firms, i.e. those that announced their decision to join at 
least one month prior to time t, whereas the second term is the effect of carbon prices 
levels on firms that make their announcement in that month.  The two effects differ in 
their specification because for “old” members, a (proportional) change in carbon prices 
leads to an adjustment of the expected abatement costs that were priced in previously, 
whereas for new members, carbon prices are incorporated into expected future profits for 
the first time.  Finally,  and  are the idiosyncratic error and the firm-specific error 
term (the random effect), respectively.  We estimate (4) using monthly data from 1991 to 
2009.                                                           
19 In specification (4), the effect of joining CCX is captured by a one-time effect on returns, which is 
equivalent to a permanent effect on prices.  To control for the possibility of lagged and/or permanent effect 
on returns, we introduced lagged versions of the announcement dummy, but they were statistically 
insignificant (results available on request).  
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3.4 Matching  
 A major concern in estimating our model is self-selection.  Treatment and control 
group membership is not randomly assigned but chosen by firms, which could lead to 
seriously biased coefficient estimates.   
 To address this problem, we construct the control group using propensity score 
matching.  Specifically, we match CCX member firms for the period between 1990 and 
the creation of the CCX (April of 2003).  We estimate the propensity to join using the 
market value of the firm, the returns from holding firm stock, and the volume of shares 
traded (along with squared terms for each of those variables).  We match members firms 
to their 5 nearest neighbors, and to their nearest neighbor (without replacement).20  We 
perform the matching procedure on two samples: across all industry rivals (firms that 
share the two-digit SIC code with a CCX member firm) and within industry (matching 
firms within particular 2-digit SIC code).   
 
4 Data and Results 
 Our data consists of monthly stock prices taken from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) for the years 1991 - 2009.21 We calculate our dependent variable, 
monthly excess return, by subtracting the risk-free rate of interest (RF) from monthly 
                                                        20 As in Kim and Lyon (2011), the voluntary program can be viewed as a treatment, and here the effect of 
joining CCX is treatment effect on the treated.  Complicating the analysis is the fact that different firms 
joined at different times.  In theory, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) would have to be 
constructed from several distinct effects occurring at different times.  Rather than explicitly computing the 
ATT for each firm and then form an average, we construct a single control group by matching and use a D-
in-D-type estimation procedure.   
21 The CRSP is a database of daily and monthly stock prices for publicly-listed ﬁrms in the United States 
going back to 1925.  CRSP is maintained at the University of Chicago; for more information, see: 
http://www.crsp.com/.   
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average stock prices.22   
 We gathered data on CCX membership from the exchange’s website.    In 2010, 
total of 109 entities were members of the CCX exchange, of which 55 were ﬁrms that are 
listed on a US stock market (NASDAQ, NYSE or AMEX).23  The majority of the non-
listed entities were cities, states and universities.  To ﬁnd the speciﬁc dates when ﬁrms 
announced their decision to join, we used ﬁnancial news outlets such as Reuters, Lexus-
Nexus, environmental news wires, general web searches, as well as companies’ own 
news releases.  We were able to identify an announcement date to join CCX for 34 of the 
listed ﬁrms.   
 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of our sample.  The sample size for the 
market variables reﬂects the number of monthly prices in our sample period.   
 
Table 1 about here.  
 
Results 
 
 Table 2 contains our regression results.  All estimates are based on a random effects 
(RE) specification and robust standard errors, clustered by firm.  To test whether different 
industries have different intercepts (i.e. different α’s), we ran ﬁxed effects (FE) 
regressions based on 2-digit SIC codes for all samples but were not able to reject the null 
                                                        
22 We use the effective federal funds rate as the risk-free rate of interest.  The effective federal funds rate is 
a weighted average of rates on brokered trades.  Monthly ﬁgures include each calendar day in the month, 
and are annualized using a 360-day year or bank interest.  Information and data are available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm.   
23 The CCX was comprised of a mix of municipalities, non-profits, and for-profit corporations. Among the 
for-profit firms (the object of this study), over 14 major (SIC) industry groups were represented, including 
agricultural, manufacturing, financial services, and consumer products. The most frequent industry 
represented in our sample was energy utilities (n = 17), followed by pulp/paper & packaging (n = 8), and 
petrochemicals (n = 7).   
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hypothesis that the industry intercepts were all identical (results not shown but available 
on request).  The FE regressions also allowed us carry out Hausman tests to confirm the 
assumption necessary for the RE structure that the individual errors ui are uncorrelated 
with the regressors.   
 Column A contains the results from estimating the 4-factor model in eq. (3) for the 
full sample.  All coefficients are highly significant and have the expected sign, 
confirming the validity of the 4-factor model as a basis for our regressions.  In column B 
we introduce carbon price information, the Waxman dummy, the announcement dummy, 
as well as the interaction terms in eq. (4).  The results indicate that firms’ announcements 
to join CCX was associated with positive excess returns, and that CCX members 
experienced positive excess returns upon the passing of the Waxman-Markey bill, 
relative to nonmembers.  Both results are consistent with the hypothesis that it pays to 
engage in voluntary environmental action.  On the other hand, member firms’ excess 
returns are not related to carbon prices, at least not differently than excess returns from 
nonmembers.  The positive and statistically significant coefficient on carbon price returns 
for all firms is presumably due to a correlation between carbon prices and the overall 
stock market.  The four-factor model, as well as the extended version in column B, 
accounts for about 7% of the variation in excess returns.   
 If membership in the treatment group is endogenous, the difference-in-difference 
estimator can be biased.  To address the endogeneity of firms’ decision to join the 
voluntary CCX program, we construct nonmember control groups by means of 
propensity score matching (see section 3.4) and estimate regressions based on these 
subsamples.  We posit that excess returns in these specifications are less likely to be 
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affected by unobserved heterogeneity associated with firm profitability, and thus give 
more credence to the variables of interest.  Using subsamples also allows us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity on the industry level by including average excess returns on the 
4-digit SIC level.24  The coefficient estimates from regressing eq. (4) on the matched 
samples are shown in columns C-F.  As before, we control for firm-level unobserved 
heterogeneity by including random effects.   
 Qualitatively, the results are similar to those based on the full sample:  There is 
evidence for positive excess returns after joining CCX (or rather, after announcing to 
join), as well as for being a CCX member when the Waxman-Markey bill was passed.  
Whereas the latter is robust to the choice of matching procedure, the significance of the 
announcement dummy depends on the matching type.  It is significant for the matched 
samples within-industry (D and F), but not across (C and E).  The fact that the intercept 
in models D and F is statistically indistinguishable from zero as predicted by economic 
theory could be interpreted such that these models do a better job in explaining firm 
excess returns than the across-industry regressions.  Note also that the explanatory power 
of the model has increased dramatically with the inclusion of industry-level excess 
returns, to 23-26%.   
 The magnitude of announcement coefficient in models D and F is similar in 
magnitude to the full sample regression, implying monthly excess returns that are about 
two percentage points higher than those of nonmember firms.  Interestingly, the 
coefficient on the (interacted) Waxman dummy is larger than for the full sample in three 
                                                        24 We do not include excess returns on the industry level for the full sample regressions because this would 
amount to including a time average of the LHS variable as a regressor, which would then “explain” almost 
the entire variation of excess returns.  This is not the case for the matched-sample regressions because the 
industry averages are computed using the full sample.   
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of the four matched regressions, and it is also larger than the announcement effect.  The 
results indicate that member firms experienced excess returns that were five percentage 
points higher than their nonmember rivals, which is quite large given that average 
monthly excess returns are about one percent (see Table 1).  Note that these are 
differential excess returns (excess returns for members minus excess returns for controls), 
meaning that they cannot be due to an exogenous shock that happened to coincide with 
the Waxman-Markey bill, and which affected all firms.  This result implies that preparing 
for regulation and thus gaining an advantage over rivals who have no carbon market 
experience may be an important reason to join CCX.   
 The price of carbon, interacted with membership status or by itself, is not 
associated with excess returns.  This suggests that abatement costs do not affect the share 
price of CCX member firms, or alternatively, that the CFI price is not a good proxy for 
abatement costs.25 We would expect those firms with higher abatement costs (heavy 
industry and manufacturing) to experience a negative impact on returns due to CCX 
membership.  However, controlling for emission intensity using 2-digit SIC coding 
(deﬁning codes 10- 14, 26, 28-29, 32-34 and 49 as emission-intensive industry groups) 
did not reveal a difference between emission-intensive and other ﬁrms in terms of the 
announcement effect and the sensitivity of returns to the carbon price.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
                                                        25 This point was made by a reviewer.  It implies that the CFI market is not efficient in the sense that the CFI price is not equal to marginal abatement costs.  Although not consistent with theory, this is a valid point in practice, especially considering the low carbon price and the different impact that reducing emissions and buying offsets may have on consumers and investors.  Whereas reducing emissions sends a message of “greenness”, buying offsets (which is physically equivalent, conditional on additionality of the offset project) may be perceived less favorably.   
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 The effect of voluntary environmental action on firm profits is ambiguous ex ante.  
Theoretically, either an increase or decrease in profitability is possible, rendering the 
question an empirical one.  We use monthly stock returns from 1991-2009 to measure the 
effect on excess returns of firm participation in the CCX, one of the first and largest 
voluntary cap-and-trade market to date.   We control for market risk as well as shocks on 
the 4-digit industry level and estimate the effect of CCX membership by means of a 
difference-in-difference approach.  We control for self-selection bias by creating a 
sample of control firms using propensity score matching.   
 We find some evidence for the hypothesis that the market rewards voluntary 
climate action: The announcement to join the program was associated with positive 
excess returns, and in two of our four matching specifications this effect was statistically 
significant at p<0.1.  Furthermore, passing of the Waxman-Markey bill in the US House 
of Represtantives in 2009, which presumably increased the likelihood of a mandatory 
regulation on the federal level, was associated with positive and highly significant excess 
returns for CCX members, implying that the market viewed previous experience in 
carbon markets as an advantage.   
 Our results indicate a market reward for potentially useful business experience in 
the face of uncertainty about environmental regulation.  This may not only explain the 
positive excess returns from the passing of Waxman-Markey, but possibly also the excess 
returns from joining in the first place: The probability of binding regulation was certainly 
increased by Waxman-Markey, but it was likely not zero before.  Of course, these initial 
excess returns could also be explained by green preferences or other mechanisms, but the 
magnitude of the market signal from an increased probability of regulation suggests that 
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preparation for future regulation was the dominant factor for joining CCX.  It follows that 
if future regulation were ruled out for some reason, there would not have been an 
incentive to join CCX either.  We conclude that voluntary GHG programs can serve as an 
experimental hedge by firms facing possible regulation, but that relying on voluntary 
action alone is not enough to combat climate change.    
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Sample    Full 
all SIC 
(n=5) 
within 
(n=5) 
all SIC 
(n=1) 
within 
(n=1) members 
N    1,763,665 1,763,665 36,086 33,249 15,870 16,685 9,539 
  Min. Max. Mean (Std) 
Excess returns     
(rit-rft) 
-0.991 23.997 
0.0093 0.0096 0.0073 0.0094 0.0077 0.0072 
(0.194) (0.113) (0.115) (0.108) (0.111) (0.108) 
Market excess ret.  
(rmt-rft) 
-0.185 0.110 
0.0056 0.0057 0.0058 0.0056 0.0054 0.0050 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
SMBt -0.220 0.138 
0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
HMLt -0.099 0.139 
0.0048 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
MOMt -0.347 0.184 
0.0062 0.0063 0.0062 0.0061 0.0059 0.0054 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) 
Carbon price ret.  
(rtC) 
-0.537 0.914 
-0.0012 -0.00001 0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00013 0.00017 
(0.121) (0.116) (0.117) (0.120) (0.123) (0.132) 
Waxman (∆Wt) -1 1 
0.00002 0.0011 0.0011 0.0025 0.0023 0.0045 
(0.006) (0.038) (0.039) (0.057) (0.055) (0.077) 
Industry rival exret 
(rtSIC-rft) 
-0.942 9.497 
0.0095 0.0101 0.0085 0.0094 0.0089 0.0083 
(0.096) (0.077) (0.080) (0.079) (0.085) (0.086) 
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Table 2: Regressions on Full and Matched Samples 
Dependent Variable: Excess Returns (rit-rft) 
Sample   Full Full 
all SIC 
(n=5) 
within 
(n=5) 
all SIC 
(n=1) 
within 
(n=1) 
N     1,704,437 1,704,437 35,479 32,704 15,553 16,364 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Market excess returns 
(rmt–rft) 
0.974*** 0.972*** 0.360*** 0.346*** 0.539*** 0.572*** 
(163.46) (162.62) (5.52) (5.60) (4.99) (6.91) 
SMBt 
0.544*** 0.542*** -0.0259 0.0188 0.0243 0.0408 
(92.59) (92.08) (-0.74) (0.57) (0.49) (0.87) 
HMLt 
0.201*** 0.202*** 0.156*** 0.165*** 0.279*** 0.223*** 
(25.18) (25.30) (3.82) (3.96) (4.57) (3.91) 
MOMt 
-0.120*** -0.124*** -0.0657*** -0.0735*** -0.0957*** -0.123*** 
(-27.63) (-28.27) (-3.80) (-3.88) (-3.41) (-4.27) 
Carbon returns (rtC)  
0.00967*** -0.000738 0.000630 0.00327 0.00786 
(9.63) (-0.14) (0.11) (0.44) (1.07) 
Carbon ret.  · member 
(rtC ·Mt-1+ln(PtC)·∆Mt)  
-0.0174 0.000943 -0.000565 -0.00110 -0.00542 
(-1.28) (0.07) (-0.04) (-0.08) (-0.37) 
Announcement (∆Mt)  
0.0226** 0.0123 0.0181* 0.0137 0.0201* 
(2.13) (1.17) (1.69) (1.30) (1.93) 
Industry ex.  returns 
(rtSIC-rft)  
 0.587*** 0.615*** 0.441*** 0.421*** 
 (8.47) (9.00) (3.98) (5.18) 
Waxman (∆Wt)  
0.0219*** -0.0257** -0.00863 -0.0153 -0.0141 
(9.15) (-2.49) (-0.74) (-1.09) (-1.41) 
Waxman · member 
(∆Wt · Mt-1)    
0.0320** 0.0564*** 0.0370* 0.0578*** 0.0572*** 
(2.48) (2.91) (1.78) (2.76) (3.09) 
Constant 0.000904*** 0.000872*** 0.00124** -0.00119 0.00136* 
-
0.0000856 
(4.32) (4.17) (2.34) (-0.66) (1.71) (-0.09) 
R sq.   within 0.0681 0.0682 0.2354 0.2649 0.2295 0.2405 
            between 0.0625 0.0629 0.1908 0.1813 0.2615 0.1804 
            overall 0.0678 0.0679 0.2356 0.2637 0.2298 0.2403 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; significance levels: * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01; use of robust standard 
errors, clustered by firm.  Mt: Membership dummy (Mt=1 if firms have announced to join, Mt=0 otherwise); 
Wt: Time dummy (Wt=1 after Waxman-Markey bill was passed, Wt=0 before).   
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Figure 1: CCX carbon price and trading volume, 2003-2010 
 Source: Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) 
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Appendix: Derivation of the regression specification 
In order to derive a theoretically consistent regression specification, we start by 
considering the price equation that gives rise to the CAPM while suppressing the 
subscripts on the coefficients:  
  (A1) 
or, equivalently,   (A2) 
Taking logs and differentiating w.r.t time gives 
  (A3) 
where a dot represents a time derivative.  Rearranging and discretizing in order to 
accommodate market data results in  
  (A4) 
where  is the first-difference operator.  Since proportional first differences are equal to 
returns, (A4) is equivalent to eq. (2) in the main text.  We now add average prices for 
“small” and “big” (in terms of market value), “high” and “low” (in terms of book-to-
market ratio) and “winners” and “losers” (in terms of the past month’s market 
performance), which are the basis for the SMB, HML and MOM factors.  This leads to 
the following equation in prices:  
  (A5) 
 32 
Following the same steps as above and using the definitions of the four factors, this 
becomes eq. (3) defined in returns.   
The RHS of (A5) does not include any firm-specific information but only depends on 
aggregate market data.  We now introduce firm-specific information.  Specifically, we 
include industry-level stock prices , the CCX carbon price , and dummies 
indicating CCX membership  (1 for CCX members, 0 otherwise) and the passing of 
the Waxman-Markey bill  (1 for June 2009, 0 otherwise).  Since the effect of the 
carbon price and Waxman-Markey can be expected to differ between members and 
nonmembers, we also include interaction terms.  In order to be consistent (both in terms 
of theory and math) with the four-factor model, we add these terms multiplicatively to the 
price equation:   
  (A6) 
Taking logs and differentiating w.r.t time:  
  (A7) 
Substituting for , discretizing and using the fact that all member firms joined CCX 
before June 2009 (implying that ) leads to the following specification:  
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 (A8) 
Writing the proportional first differences as returns and substituting the definitions of the 
SMB, HML and MOM factors, this becomes eq. (4).   
